Makes sense.
Makes sense.
The app is also literally called Little Red Book as an alternative name
Lol, couldn’t I be either and have it still be a genuine question? I haven’t been diagnosed with autism, but I could have it, and I’ve also been called a pedant at times. All told, the question is genuine all the same.
Fair enough, just thought we were having an interesting convo. I was looking forward to hearing your insights, which I appreciate.
What is A in this case (that which is definitively known)? The fact one has a subjective experience of some kind of perceived reality and in this reality we see other people that tell us they’re real and say they have separate minds to us? And then is B the proposition “reality is real to a degree insofar as other minds that appear to exist do indeed exist and are sentient and hold opinions”? Because I agree A doesn’t necessarily entail B in that case, it is something that I’m assuming for sake of argument as a basis for further reasoning.
But if we presuppose both A and B are true (let’s call them AB), then it seems like the information and observed, even anecdotal/firsthand experience we can obtain from reality (and especially if we trust secondhand sources, but even if not) appears to (uncertainly) create the grounds for a case to be made that, using reasoning and empirical observations (a combination of a priori and a posteriori), we can deduce that if a large number of people care about a wide variety of diverse interests (which seems to be deducible by AB + an average experience of life where you meet a significant number of people who aren’t lying to you (=C)), then there is a high likelihood of at least one of them caring about a given subject or phenomenon?
So this is assuming some things, such as A (apparently known, so maybe not assumed), in addition to B & C, but if ABC, then is it really an invalid form of reasoning to conclude or speculate that D (someone cares) is likely? Is any form of argument which isn’t entirely certain unequivocally invalid? Because then you can’t really consider anything valid (aside from A, or things which are known beyond a shadow of doubt, even if you acknowledge their uncertainty), right? This is why certain elements of Descartes’ philosophy seem absurd to me… in addition to the intuitively contradictory idea that “All that we can know is I think therefore I am, but also God exists and is an evil demon that has created a false reality(?)”…
Interesting. Could you possibly elaborate?
I suffer from social anxiety, but I’m unsure how you inferred that based on my post or my writing style (I also have incoherent thoughts sometimes, so it may just be coincidental). Not offended at all btw, I only mildly care (lol). Just curious. And I appreciate your comment.
Yeah, “who asked?” is the other one. Also doesn’t seem literal, because does someone really need to ask you about something in order for you to offer your opinion on it? Is this one of those weird, oppressive, “you shall only speak when spoken to” situations, arguably harkening back to multiple forms of historical discrimination/oppression & attempts to silence people or restrict freedom of speech/dissenting thought (not consciously, I’m almost positive)?. Seems like a thought-terminating cliche, basically meaningless, just a method of shutting anyone down without having to provide any justified reason. Also could be bullying depending on how it’s used. But yeah, mostly it’s just nonsense. I appreciate your comments & advice.
What if the tree looked exactly like your face and you failed to recognise it so I obsessively photographed it from all angles & made you gaze at the photos until you agreed with me and said “Huh. Something’s up with that”.?
“Only from our direct experience can we claim any knowledge about the world.”
My direct experiences tell me that there are a lot of diverse humans, and even other sentient beings/non-human animals who could potentially care about something. For example, if I wear a blue shirt and want to tell everyone about it, I might find (or perhaps never know for certain, but have reason to believe based on perceived observances of behavior/expression) that a cow given the name Samantha is the only one who actually appreciates it. Or maybe no one does, it’s possible, but it seems like we can infer that’s unlikely given how varied the individuals on the planet are, and even other relevant information about them, such as the observation that blue is a popular favorite color. But even though we can reason the likelihood of that based on certain presuppositions (such as reality being real, rather than a simulation, but even then you could argue it still exists on some level if not physically, & solipsism being doubtful due to the verisimilitude of life, but even granting it trivially, establishing some truth of reality & in particular the existence of other minds than my own as a basis for reasoning), it’s still not entirely certain, and yet neither is the claim that no one cares. It seems like “someone (other than myself) cares” and “no one (other than myself) cares” are both technically unprovable claims, but if we agree on reality being real & other functional minds existing and establish common ground there, we should be able to grant some degree of credence via the observations we experience in this “reality” to the notion or theory that there is a stronger likelihood of at least some other mind being one who would or may care (even if they don’t currently, possibly due to lack of awareness of the thing to care about), than to the idea that no one would care, no?
But it really the case that no one cares? I suspect that some people might.
But does no one really care? I think at least someone might.
Sure, if you look at it from a utilitarian perspective I suppose.
“One’s rights end where another’s begin” - Morally speaking I agree with this, and I’ve heard this phrase used by animal rights activists to argue that humans shouldn’t have the right to violate animals’ (moral) rights to be free, to not be killed, harmed, exploited etc. at least by humans who are moral agents & don’t need to do so.
Again, there is a difference between moral and legal rights. Just like in the case of human slavery where some humans technically had the legal right to enslave other humans - and I would agree that those laws were unethical to begin with since the moral rights of those slave owners to do things (“positive” rights) ended where the moral rights of the victims to be free from oppression/harm/etc (“negative” rights) began - many people argue that the current legal rights of humans to, basically, enslave & kill non-human animals, are similarly built on unethical laws, and don’t translate to moral rights, in the sense that humans’ rights also end where other animals’ rights begin, morally speaking (such a position would of course entail action to liberate non-human animals via boycotting of animal exploitation (veganism) as a moral obligation, similarly to how when the laws that enabled people to own slaves were in place, boycotting the slave trade and being an abolitionist would also be considered a moral obligation by most people today).
I would also add that it seems that rights are a human concept/social construct, even just in the sense that we’re interpreting what we believe to be ethical/right/moral, even if it’s objectively correct; or we’re enforcing laws based on what people believe is correct, or in some cases what serves certain people personally at the expense of what most people believe is right if the laws are corrupt/undemocratic.
So I think if we’re going to claim that a certain right “just is”, since we’re the ones creating these concepts even if it’s based on our observation of the world and an interpretation that was theoretically objectively correct if not a belief, it falls on us to rationalise and describe how we’re coming to these conclusions and what we’re basing this assertion of a certain right on. Otherwise, “it’s a human right because it’s a human right” is just circular reasoning and has no explanation. How are we formulating our basis for what is a human right? Is it legality? Is it moral beliefs or what we reason (or even logically prove somehow) is objectively morally right? Or … what?
For example, in the case of animal rights theory, many people believe that there are moral rights that animals hold as moral patients, i.e. “negative rights” (= freedom from something being done to an individual) not to be exploited and killed by humans (moral agents), which extend logically from the belief (or fact) of human rights also being morally correct. And in this view, humans by way of our laws, do hold legally the “positive rights” (= freedom of an individual to do something) to exploit and kill animals, but these legal rights are simultaneously violating the moral rights of the animals to not have these things done to them by humans/moral agents.
In this case too, similar to what you said about the human condition, we could argue that something about the condition of animals (which could for example be sentience/consciousness, which they share with humans who are also animals), is the basis for them having these rights, but even then we’re still speculating based on what we believe is either subjectively or objectively moral (since in that case obviously what’s legal is in contradiction with what’s deemed to be moral), and I’m not sure what third definition of rights could be being applied there whether it be in the context of human rights or animal rights.
Human rights describes the individuals that the rights pertain to, no? So those human rights could either be based in legality or in morality, which wouldn’t always align. People may also have different beliefs about which human rights are morally justified and which ones aren’t. If there’s a third kind of human right that isn’t based on what’s legal or what’s believed to be (or, fundamentally is) moral, then what’s it based in?
Inherent to the human condition is interesting, but isn’t that still a moral stance/belief? Even if you argue that it’s objectively moral (and if you don’t believe in moral subjectivism/moral relativism) or objectively the right thing for humans to have rights based on the kind of beings that they are, how is that separate from morality? As far as I know when someone says “this is a human right” they’re usually asserting that they believe it’s morally correct for humans to have a certain right, and that it would be wrong to violate that right. Occasionally someone says “this is a legally protected human right” to emphasise that it’s a legal right enforced by law. I’m not sure by what metric rights could be ascribed or theorised conceptually to apply to certain individuals, if not law or ethics.
For example, you could say that the law did violate the enslaved’s moral human rights, by assigning other humans a legal right to own them, which many at the time would have also believed was their moral right, even if we don’t agree with that today or assert as being objectively immoral. If their human right to not be enslaved wasn’t legal or moral, I don’t see what the third option could be.
I’m fairly sure human rights can be used to describe either moral rights or legal rights. In most contexts people are using human rights in a moral sense, but it can be used in a legal sense too. If you’re arguing for a third definition of human rights which isn’t based in morality (what’s good) or legality (what’s been passed as law), then what is it based in?
I appreciate and respect all your points and largely agree. For the record I won’t be buying a Tesla, I just thought it was an interesting discussion. I do want to comment on the “There is no ethical consumption under capitalism” aphorism/maxim, in a way that I think supports your argument or at least the logic underlying it.
Firstly, even if it is the case that there is no ethical consumption under capitalism, that doesn’t appear to suggest that there can’t possibly be varying degrees of morality of different forms of consumption under capitalism. In other words, even if all consumption under capitalism is unethical, there can still be more ethical (or less unethical) and less ethical (or more unethical) consumption under capitalism, at least in theory. Not all consumption under capitalism is necessarily ethically identical or equivalent.
If it were the case that all consumption under capitalism was equal in moral wrongness or moral weight, with no variation, then it seems to follow that supporting a Tesla would be no worse or better than supporting any other vehicle (or product/service for that matter). I don’t think this is true, and I think your point demonstrates that it isn’t true as well. It’s possible that it would be worse than supporting other things, and there could also be things that are worse than supporting a Tesla in theory.
This is important not just for the sake of a semantic technicality, but because people (consumers) frequently use the “There is no ethical consumption under capitalism” phrase to deny any moral responsibility for their actions related to consumption. I think that precisely because we do have differing choices available to us (within the flawed capitalistic system), which are not necessarily morally equal (even if they are all immoral, just to different degrees or in different ways), and some consumption decisions are more unethical than others, we do have moral responsibility to choose the least unethical (or “most ethical”) options that we can realistically access.
To suggest that “because all things are bad, it doesn’t matter what we do” (not that you’re saying this, quite the opposite), would be somewhat evoking an appeal to futility and nirvana fallacy; because nothing is perfect, there is no difference between any solution/option and any effort to reduce harm is invalid. And I think this is the mentality that people are embodying when they use the no ethical consumption under capitalism line to justify their morally questionable decisions.
Secondly, and somewhat less importantly depending on intended meaning behind the phrase, I’m not certain that there is no such thing as ethical consumption under a capitalist rule in technical terms, as despite the inherent ethical problems with capitalism, I don’t think it’s really morally reasonable to expect someone to do something they can’t physically/possibly do, or which would involve self-sacrifice. If there were truly no ethical consumption under capitalism, then if someone wanted to be perfectly ethical, the only morally permissible option would be to unalive themself (which comes with other moral consequences). So it’s basically a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation, which doesn’t quite sit well with me. I appreciate the sentiment behind the saying, as it alludes to the inherent & inescapable problems with capitalism (which can only be addressed by changing the system entirely), but I think it makes sense that ought implies can (Kant’s ethical formula whereby if something is morally obligated to do or an action is one’s moral duty to carry out (or refrain from doing, if it’s in reference to negative duties), then it must be within a moral agent’s ability to do so - or I would add, within the scope of generally intuitive reasonability as an expectation for them to do, since it might be technically possible for them to do something if it involved significantly harming or compromising their own life, but that expectation or imposition on them would violate their own rights to self preservation, autonomy, etc). In other words, if someone is truly doing everything they can within reason or practicability to avoid making unethical consumption choices, or to make the least unethical choices available to them in a broken system that they didn’t design themself or choose to be born into, then in my book, they are being ethical as a moral agent, despite the unethical capitalist system they live in. But we should all do what we can to help reform it additionally where possible.
I hope this makes sense & wasn’t too convoluted, pedantic or annoying :)